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[Crim. No. 6999. In Bank. May 17, 1962.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL KEHN 
HiBLER, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-
Evidence in a murder case that defendant and his confederate 
entered the store of a total stranger with a loaded gun at the 
ready, walked to the cash rrgi ster and shot the proprietor when 
he emerged from under the counter shows overt acts toward 
committing a robbery that clearly justify an inference that 
there was a specific intent to commit that crime. Such intent 
may be established by the circumstances surrounding defend-
ant's actions. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-An infer-
ence in a murder case that defendant intended to commit rob-
bery when he entered a store with a loaded gun and shot the 
proprietor was supported by evidence of his subsequent par-
ticipation with the same confederate in a robbery in another 
city. 
[3] Id.-Instructions-Grades and Degrees of Offense.-Wher e no 
evidence was offered in It lllunlt'r case to show that defendant 
enteren the store of the victim for any purpose other than 
r obbcry and it was difficult to conceive of any other purpose, 
the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on second 
degree murder. 
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Identity.-An extrajudicial identi-
fication is admissible, not only to corroborate an identification 
lJ\ade at the trial, hut as independent e,idence of identity. 
[5] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-A picture or drawing embodying a 
representation of a witness' extrajudicial declarations of the 
[1] See Cal.Jl:r.2d, H om iciJe, §§ 17:2, 177: Am.Jur., Homicid", 
§ 468. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Homicide, § 145(5); [3] Homicidt!, 
§ 183; [4, 5] Crimjnal Law, § 374; [6] Jury, § 103 (7); [7] Wit-
nesses, § 195: [8] Witlles~es, § 1·19; [9] Criminal Law, § 1447; 
[10] Criminal Law, § 632. 
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killer's physical charact('ristics is admissible in a murder case 
for the purpose of identification. 
[6] Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-Counsel 
for defendant in a capital case has the right to inquire into 
a prospective juror's views on capital punishment, but this 
right was not infringed where counsel asked the juror whether 
he knew that an organization to which the juror belonged 
advocated the death penalty, to which the juror answered that 
he did not, at which point an objection was sustained as to the 
form of the question only, counsel was then allowed to question 
the juror on his personal beliefs as opposed to those of the 
organization, and thereafter passed the juror for cause. 
[7] Witnesses-Impeachment-Mental Condition.-Defendant in a 
murder case was not prejudiced by asserted restrictions on 
his counsel's attempt to impeach an identification witness for 
lack of mental capacity where the trial court allowed counsel 
the greatest latitude in his cross-examination, he was allowed 
to question the witness about commitment to mental institu-
tions despite the fact that the most recent commitment was 
more than 10 years before the trial, and counsel also asked 
a number of questions regarding recent treatment for mental 
disorder and the answers were negative. 
[8] Id.-Cross-examination-Identification of Accused.-Defend-
ant's counsel in a murder case was not unduly hampered in 
his cross-examination in assertedly not being allowed to show 
that at the police lineup the witnesses were uncertain in iden-
tifying defendant and that they discussed among themselves 
whether he was the right man, where the record revealed that 
the defense was allowed to explore the matter as thoroughly 
as desired, that the answers elicited were damaging to the 
defense, and that the objections sustained by the court were 
primarily to the form of questions asked. 
[9] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reversal-Grounds.-Although de-
fendant should have been taken before the magistrate on a 
murder charge within the time limit prescribed in Pen. Code, 
§ 825, the failure to do so was not a ground for reversing the 
conviction where he \,as legally in custody at this time because 
he had pleaded guilty to a robbery. 
[10] ld.-Argument of Counsel-Penalty Phase of Case.-Though 
the prosecutor in his argument to the jury in a murder case 
discussed the deterrent effect of the death penalty, such dis-
cussipn was not prejudicial where it was temperate and re-
strained and was only a brief and minor part of his argument. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Jury, § 50. 
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APPEAIJ, automatica1ly tah n ullcler P en. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b ) , from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Mark 
Brandler, Judge. Affirmed . 
Prosecution for murder and for assault with a deadly 
weapon with intent to commit murder . Judgment of cOll\' ic-
tion imposing the death p enal ty on the murder count, affirmed. 
Gregory S. Stout, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for D ef endant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James and 
Gilbert F . Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.--Def ellc1ant was convicted of first degree 
murder and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to 
commit murder. The jury fixed the penalty at death , and the 
trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. This 
ap peal is automatic. (P en. Code, § 1239, subd. (b) .) 
On the evening of J anuary 4, 1961, two men entered a Los 
Angeles grocery store owned by Morris Hassen. They walked 
to the check stand where Mr. Hassen was leaning down dust-
ing liquor bottles. Mrs. Hassen, who was standing nearby, 
testified that she moved to the check stand to wait on the 
men, that as she did so she noticed her husband getting up 
f rom behind the stand and that" by the look of his face" she 
could see that something was wrong. 'Vhen she bent down 
to ask what the trouble was, she saw a gun prot ruding from 
the coat of the man subsequently identified by other witnesses 
as defendant . A moment later the gun discharged, fatally 
wounding Mr. Hassen. The men turned, walked from the 
store, and departed in different directions. 
At the trial def endant denied participating in the crime. 
His defense consisted primarily of an alibi and impeachment 
of the identification witnesses. The evidence, ho"ever, was 
more than sufficient to establish that he did the shooting. 
Although Mrs. Hassen was unable to see his fa ce because his 
hat was tilted. !She was able to identify the hat and coat he 
was wearing. She identified the second man from police photo-
graphs as Leonard Lingo, who was killed 10 days after the 
shooting when he accompanied defendant on an armed robbery 
in P omona. 
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Alfred Costello, an identification witness, was walking on 
the opposite side of the street when his attention was attracted 
to the store by two men standing at the cash register. When 
he heard a shot he crossed the street to investigate, <lnd in a 
lighted area in front of the store and at a distance between 
8 and 12 feet, he viewed defendant who was still wearing the 
hat and coat and still carrying a gun. According to Costello, 
defendant turned into an alley, dropped his hat, and began to 
run. Costello gave cbase. Defendant paused in the alley 
under a light as if "trying to make up his mind whether to 
go right or left," and Costello was able to see him without 
the hat at a distance between 15 and 20 feet. Defendant then 
fired a shot that hit a wall behind Costello, discarded his coat, 
and fled through a parking lot. Costello retrieved the coat and 
discovered a gun in it identified by a ballistics expert as the 
murder weapon. Costello positively identified defendant as 
the man he had pursued. 
Alonzo Dunlap, an attendant at the parking lot through 
which defendant escaped, testified that he got a side and front 
view of defendant as he walked through the illuminated lot. 
Although Dunlap did not hear any shots, his testimony other-
wise corroborated Costello's testimony. 
Billy Hillen, a third witness, was leaving the market when 
defendant and Lingo entered. He testified that he got a good 
look at both men, and he identified defendant's hat and coat. 
Wben Hillen had walked only a few steps from the store, he 
heard a shot and turned around. He again looked closely at 
the two men as they left the store, and observed defendant 
holding a gun. Hillen had no difficulty in picking defendant 
out of a lineup at police headfluarters, anel he also identified 
defendant at the trial. 
Defendant testified that he spent the evening of the shoot-
ing in yarious bars with Jerry Mayes, Robert Mahon, and two 
men whose names he could not recall, and that he was also 
accompanied by a girl named Ann at the bar where he claimed 
to be at the time of the killing. Only Mayes could be located 
to testify in defendant's behalf, although an investigator 
attached to the public defender 's office attempted to trace the 
others. Mayes, who was in custody for accompanying de-
fendant and Lingo on the Pomona robbery, corroborated de-
fendant's testimony on all but minor points. On eross-
examination, however, he admitted that "It's hard to be cer-
tain" that the evening he recalled was the night of the 
murder. Dewitt Lightner, a police officer, testified that he 
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liad asked defemlant if he had auy alibi that could be checked 
out, and that defendant replied in effect that he could not 
account for his time, but that he was probably drinking at the 
Four Aces Bar, and that he also said there was no one with 
him who could account for his time. 
Defeuuant contends that even if the evidence was sufficient 
to sustain a finding that he was the killer, it did not demon-
strate that a robbery was being perpetrated that would make 
the killing murder in the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189 ; 
People v. Goefield, 37 Ca1.2d 865, 868 [236 P.2d 570].) The 
only instructions given to the jury on degrees of murder 
were: "Murder is classified into two degrees, that of murder 
in the first degree anu that of murder in the second degree" 
and" All murder which is committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate robbery is murder of the first degree." 
The court also defined robbery and attempt. Admittedly, 
there was no evidence that defendant or Lingo demanded 
money of the deceased or that they took money after the 
killing'. Indeed, since defendant asserted throughout the 
trial that he was not the killer, there was no explanation why 
thc gun discharged. [1] The evidence establishes, however, 
that defendant and his confederate entered the store of a total 
stranger with a loaded gun at the ready; they walked to the 
cash register and shot the proprietor when he emerged from 
under the counter. These were overt acts toward committing 
a robbery that clearly justify an inference that there was a 
specific intent to commit that crime. Such intent may he 
established by the circumstances surrounding a defendant's 
actions. (People v. Je1~nillgs, 158 Cal.App.2d 159, 165-166 
[322 P.2d 19] ; see People v. Hubler, 102 Cal.App.2d 689, 695 
[228 P .2d 37]; State Y. Burnett, 37 Wn.2d 619 [225 P.2d 
416, 417-418].) [2] The inference that defendant inteHdcd to 
commit robbery is also supported by his subsequent partici-
pation with Lingo in the robbery in Pomona, evidence of 
which was admitted without objection and indeed elicited in 
part by the defense. (See People v. Goefield, supra, at pp. 
869-870; People v. Peete, 28 Ca1.2d 306, 315-316 [169 P.2d 
9~4] ; 7 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 463.) [3] There was no evidence 
offered tending ta show that defendant entered the store for 
any purpose other than robbery, and it is difficult to con-
ceive of any other purpose. The trial court, therefore, did not 
err in failing to instruct on second degree murder. (People 
v. Green, 13 Ca1.2d 37, 44 [87 P .2d 821] ; People v. Lloyrl, 
98 Cal.App.2d 305, 311 [220 P.2t1 10] ; People v. Sameniego, 
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118 Cal.App. 165, 170-171 [4 P.2d 800, 5 P.2d 653]; see 
People v. Moran, 18 Cal.App. 209 [122 P. 969].) 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed prej-
udicial error in admitting hcarsay cvidence. Before defend-
ant was taken into custody a police artist made a drawing of 
the killer as described by the witness Costello. The picture 
was modified later, following suggestions of Costello and 
other witnesses. At trial, Costello was shown the picture, 
and he identified it. The picture was first admitted into evi-
dence without objection, but defendant's counsel was later 
allowed to interpose the objections of lack of foundation and 
immateriality. The picture was again admitted. Although 
the picture was a representation of extrajudicial declarations 
of the witness regarding the killer's physical characteristics, 
Costello, the police artist, and other identification witnesses 
all testified and were cross-examined on the matter. (See 
People v. Gould, 54 Ca1.2d 621, 626 [354 P.2d 865] ; Morgan, 
Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv.L.Rev.177, 192-193.) [4] "[A]n 
extrajudicial identification is admissible, not only to corrobo-
rate an identification made at the trial [citation], but as in-
dependent evidence of identity." (People v. Gould, supra.) 
[5] Similarly this pictorial embodiment of a physical de-
scription is admissible for that purpose. The defense at-
tempted to show that Costello identified defendant at a police 
lineup only after he had heard the other witnesses do so. 
The implication that he could not make a certain identification 
could be offset by showing that he had previously described 
defendant with sufficient accuracy that an artist could con-
struct a reasonable likeness of defendant after other wit-
nesses made minor corrections. 
[6] Defendant asserts that his counsel was unduly re-
stricted in his voir dire examination of a prospective juror 
regarding the juror's views on capital punishment. Counsel 
has the right to inquire into the juror's opinions on the 
subject (People v. H1Lghes, ante, pp. 89, 96 [17 Cal.Rptr. 
617, 367 P.2d 33]), but the record reveals that this right 
was not infringed. Defendant's counsel asked the juror 
whether he knew that an organization to which the juror 
belonged advocated retaining the death penalty. The juror 
answered that he did not, and at this point an objection was 
sustained as to the form of the question only. Counsel was 
then allowcd to question the juror on his personal beliefs as 
opposed to those of the organization. Apparently counsel 
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was satisfied with the answers, for he passed the juror for 
cause. 
[7] There is no merit in defendant's contcntion that he 
was prejudiced by restrictions on his counsel's attempt to 
impeach the witness Costello on the ground he lacked mental 
capacity. The trial court allowed counsel the greatest latitude 
in his cross-examination. He was allowed to question Costello 
about commitment to mental institutions despite the fact that 
the most recent commitment was more than 10 years before 
the trial. Counsel also asked a number of questions regarding 
recent treatment for mental disorder, and the answers were 
negative. 
[8] Equally without merit is defendant's contention that 
he was not allowed to show that at the police lineup the wit-
nesses were uncertain in identifying him and that they dis-
cussed among themselves whether he was the right man. The 
record reveals that the defense was allowed to explore the 
matter as thoroughly as desired and that the answers elicited 
were damaging to the defense. The objections sustained by 
the court were primarily to the form of questions asked. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that counsel was unduly 
hampered in his cross-examination. 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's objections were 
so numerous that defense counsel was unable properly to con-
duct his case. Twice during the trial counsel objected to the 
court that he "as being unduly harassed. The record, how-
ever, discloses no such harassment and indicates that the 
defense was permitted to present any relevant evidence it 
had. 
[9] Defendant contends that his conviction must be re-
versed because he was taken into custody on January 14, 
1961, but was not informed of the charges against him until 
the following February 14. Defendant was legally in custody 
during this time becanse he had pleaded guilty to the robbery 
in Pomona. Although he should have been taken before the 
magistrate on the murder charge within the time limit pre-
scribed in Penal Code section 825, the failure to do so is not 
a ground for rewrsing the conviction. (Rogers v. Superior 
Court, 46 Ca1.2d 3, 9-10 [291 P.2d 929] .) 
[10] Finally, 'defendant contends that nnder People v. 
Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 731-732 [17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 
809], he is entitled to a new trial on the penalty imposed 
because of the prosecutor's argument to the jury as to the 
deterrent effect of the death penalty. The prosecutor's discus-
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sion in that regard, offered to the jury as "another factor you 
can consider," was temperate and restrained and was only a 
brief and minor part of his argument. The error was therefore 
not prejudicial. (People v. Gar'ncr, ante, pp. 135, 156 [18 
Cal.Rptr. 40,367 P.2d 680].) 
The judgment and order denying defendant's motion for a 
new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J ., Peters, J., White, J., and Dool-
ing, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
